Note the new location for the seminar.


Thursday, January 15th, 2004.
Room 202, Packard Building

 Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy


Tim Roughgarden

UC Berkeley


About the talk:
 
The "price of anarchy"---the worst-case ratio between the social objective function value of an equilibrium and that of a social optimum---is an increasingly popular measure of the extent to which competition approximates cooperation.  It has recently been applied in several theoretical studies of network games.  We will illustrate its use in one such game, "selfish routing".

About the speaker:
 
Tim Roughgarden received his BS and MS degrees from StanfordUniversity in 1997 and 1998, and his PhD in from Cornell University in 2002.  He is currently an NSF Postdoctoral Fellow at UC Berkeley, and will join Stanford's computer science faculty in the fall of 2004.
                                                                                
Dr. Roughgarden's research interests lie on the interface of combinatorial optimization and game theory.  For his PhD work, he received SIGACT's Danny Lewin Best Student Paper Award, the Mathematical Programming Society's Tucker Prize, INFORM's Optimization Prize for Young Researchers, and an honorable mention for the ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award.